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Abstract
Sharanjit D. Pujji
COGNITIVE, EMOTIONAL, AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS RELATED TO
DELUSIONAL IDEATION
2017-2018
Thomas Dinzeo, Ph.D.
Masters of Arts in Clinical Mental Health Counseling

Our beliefs profoundly influence how we interact and understand the experiences
we have and the world around us. However, some individuals may develop “false”
beliefs (i.e., delusions) that are not grounded in consensual reality that may create
adversities for the individual or others. Although various theories have been developed
relating to the formation and maintenance of delusions, explaining their origins,
meanings, and precise influence is a difficult task due to the highly individualistic nature
of beliefs. The current study examined a number of likely candidate processes suspected
of contributing to the formation and maintenance of delusional ideation in a sub-clinical
sample of 200 undergraduate students. Overall, mixed support for our hypotheses were
found. As expected, sub-clinical schizophrenia-spectrum symptomology were highly
correlated. Additionally, delusional ideation was predicted by cognitive and mood facets,
and normative beliefs such as spirituality. Expansive delusions in particular were
predictive of self-esteem, sense of purpose, and approaching significance with positive
affect, highlighting potential positive influences of delusional ideation. Certain elements
of cognitive processes, symptomology, emotional, and contextual factors may interact
with an individual’s self-view, which in turn may influence the content of specific types
of delusional ideation, perhaps leading to the formation and maintenance of such beliefs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Our beliefs fundamentally shape how we view our daily experiences; these
perceptions influence how we behave and the life choices we make. Theorists have
attempted to define and explain how false beliefs that significantly deviate from shared
consensus (i.e., delusions) are formed and maintained. Early theories have consistently
linked the notion of delusions to that of madness or mental disorders (Jaspers, 1968),
though explaining its origins and meaning proved to be a difficult task. Many
contemporary models of delusion formation stem from the pioneering work of Karl
Jaspers harkening back to the early 1900s. Jaspers states there are three main criteria that
explain the presence of delusions: 1) staunch conviction that the belief is true, 2) not
yielding to contrary evidence that may discredit the belief and 3) the factual
implausibility of the belief (Jaspers, 1968). Jaspers used the term delusion-like ideas to
denote delusional beliefs that are derived from the individual’s background and
familial/cultural experiences, whereas delusion-proper did not have this basis (Jaspers,
1968).
Modern theories influenced by Jaspers’ work tend to reference the notion of
anomalous experiences contributing to the formation of delusional beliefs. Roberts (1991,
1992) suggests that based on previous research there are three phases that contribute to
the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. The first phase is a state of prepsychosis. Within this phase, there are stages of predisposing (innate, biological) and
precipitating factors (life events, experiences) that exist. The second phase is called the
acute phase and involves a prodromal stage of an anomalous experience. The individual
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attempts to put meaning onto and explain this experience. Most often this is a noncomplex delusion and perhaps might be novel to the individual. If the individual suggests
a meaning that is not in line with the experience or their own background delusionsproper, or primary delusions are formed. Phase three is the chronic phase in which the
individual elaborates and expands their delusional belief to similar, new, or existing
experiences (Roberts, 1991, 1992). Maher (1992) adds that individuals seek to put
meaning to anomalous experiences in order to relieve any tension that might arise from
the unknown-like quality and confusion of such experiences. Many beliefs, whether
delusional or “normal” (fitting with the surrounding culture and society) involve an
attribution of meaning or explanation to experiences (Maher, 1992). However, the
contributing factors to the formation and maintenance of beliefs are highly individualized
and can vary greatly from person to person (Roberts, 1992).
Importantly, Jaspers (1968), Maher (1992), and Roberts (1991, 1992), have all
noted that delusions might form in order to provide a sense of meaning, explanation, or
purpose to the individual. In fact, the concepts of Maher and Roberts include this notion
as a central point. Once meaning is applied to an experience, many individuals report a
diminishment in the internal distress that was related to their uncertainty. In this sense,
certain delusions might provide the means for an individual to cope with their
surrounding experiences and perhaps even aid in explaining and putting meaning to
certain physical and mental symptoms that they might be experiencing. On the other side,
studies have found that the presence of delusions can also be associated with levels of
depression and anxiety (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010) and can further alienate
individuals from social supports (Saha, Scott, Varghese, & McGrath, 2012; Ertugrul, &
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Uluğ, 2004) or lead to potentially dangerous behaviors (Joseph, Victor, & Rimona, 2011;
Onwumere, Learmonth, & Kuipers, 2016). Thus, the adaptive (or meaning-creating)
nature of delusional beliefs and the potential harm to the individual and society are two
sides of the same coin that must be considered when working clinically with individuals
who have formed delusional beliefs. Treatment plans that take into account this duality
have a much greater likelihood of being effective.
With this in mind, basic research on belief-formation and belief-maintenance in
subclinical populations is quite rare. This is unfortunate since this form of research has
the potential to aid in the prediction of future clinical diagnoses and symptomology
(Verdoux & van Os, 2002). More information is needed regarding the factors that
influence how an individual perceives, interprets, and copes with the circumstances that
surround them. The development of delusional beliefs can occur across a range of
physical health and mental health diagnoses (Maher 1992). In particular, delusional
beliefs and ideation are listed among the possible criteria for all the schizophreniaspectrum disorders listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 is used by mental health professionals in
North America to formally diagnose mental disorders. Thus, delusions or delusion-like
beliefs are viewed as being a central feature of the primary psychotic disorders that range
from the sub-clinical symptoms of schizotypy (Debbané, Van der Linden, Gex-Fabry &
Eliez, 2009) to cluster A personality disorders (e.g., schizotypal personality disorder)
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), through the various clinical manifestations of
the schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Barrantes-Vidal, Chun, Myin-Germeys & Kwapil,
2013; Debbané, Van der Linden, Balanzin, Billieux & Eliez, 2012; Nunn, Rizza & Peters,
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2001; Smith, Riley & Peters, 2009; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). The concepts of
multifinality (i.e., similar pathways to multiple symptomology outcome presentations)
and equifinality (i.e., multiple pathways to a single or similar symptomology outcome
presentation) apply to the development of delusional beliefs since the exact factors are
not necessarily consistent and present across all those that experience delusions (Cicchetti
& Rogosch, 1996). Thus, studying a multitude of potential factors is needed to illuminate
the “common” and idiopathic mechanisms behind the formation and maintenance of
delusional beliefs. In fact, Roberts (1992) stated that there is a need to attempt to develop
an intricate and multifaceted approach to understanding delusions across disciplines.
Thus, prior to articulating the purpose of the present study, some basic background on
potential factors that can be involved in belief (normative and abnormal) formation and
maintenance is provided.

4

Chapter 2
Literature Review
Potential Factors Involved in Belief Formation and Maintenance
There are several likely candidates that may be involved in belief formation and
maintenance. These may include elements of symptomology, cognitive processes, and the
influence of society. We have organized the following review based on the major themes
present within the literature.
Anxiety, uncertainty, and meaning. Maher (1992) states that an odd experience
(i.e., one that cannot be accounted for based on previous understandings) can generate the
need for an individual to explicitly construct new explanations, or rationalizations for the
experience in order to avoid the angst associated with the unknown, which may be
experienced as threatening or confusing. Thus, in the context of Robert’s (1991, 1992)
precipitating and predisposing factors, delusions might be constructed in essence to
protect the individual from the fear of the unknown and to maintain the integrity of the
individual’s core belief systems (Roberts, 1992, Maher, 1992) and sense of wellbeing
(Jolley, Garety, Bebbington, Dunn, Freeman, Kuipers &…Hemsley, 2006). However, the
newly constructed belief may not fit in with the most plausible explanation. Self-esteem
might also have a role in the formation and maintenance of delusions (Jolley et al., 2006),
where beliefs are formed in order to preserve an individual’s self-esteem. This has
particular clinical implications because individuals with higher self-esteem and purpose
might be prone to higher levels of delusional ideation, and find their delusions to be on
the rewarding and positive side (Roberts, 1991).
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Incompatible situations and explanations might be viewed as a defensive act if the
plausible explanation is somehow threatening to their perceived integrity/wellbeing.
Stated another way, individuals might try to irrationally explain anomalous experiences
due to a fear or intolerance of the unknown combined with other indefinite predisposing
and precipitating factors. The intolerance of uncertainty can invoke depression and
anxiety (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Maher, 1992), both of
which tend to have relationships with delusions (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010) and
schizotypy (Debbané, Van der Linden, Gex-Fabry, & Eliez, 2009). Furthermore irrational
beliefs may be reinforced through the comfort and relief from tension and anxiety that
they provide regardless of the soundness of that explanation (Maher, 1992). However,
once formed, these irrational beliefs create their own potential for distress and conflict.
The formation and presence of delusions can be related to reported levels of stress
(Maher, 1992), anxiety, and depression (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010). Affect and
feelings may also influence perceptual experiences, symptomology, and memory (Ditman
& Kuperberg, 2005; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Daily life stressors in
particular have been linked to negative lifestyle factors and symptoms of psychosis and
perhaps even precipitating certain psychological symptoms (Barrantes-Vidal, Chun,
Myin-Germeys, & Kwapil, 2013).
Similarly, this process of delusional formation stated above can be applied to
medical issues. Currently, there is a desire in multiple fields for research that seeks to
focus on relationships between schizophrenia-spectrum and mental health diagnoses and
physical illnesses as well as how they impact the individual (Slavich, 2015; Vancampfort,
De Hert, Sweers, De Herdt, Detraux, & Probst, 2013). Previous associations with
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schizophrenia include: asthma (Pedersen, Benros, Agerbo, Børglum, & Mortensen,
2012); obesity and other persistent diagnoses (Shen, Sambamoorthi, & Rust, 2008); and
cognitive impairments in immediate memory and attention in individuals that have been
diagnosed with both schizophrenia and diabetes (Han, Huang, Chen, Xiu, Kosten, &
Zhang, 2013). However, very little to no research exists on physical illnesses and
schizotypy. If an individual has a medical experience, they might also seek to find an
explanation or cause. If the resulting explanation is not rational, similar dysfunctional and
perhaps delusional beliefs and ideation might arise in order to experience the relief
associated with understanding the source of a medical ailment. It is also possible for an
individual to feel that a remission from a medical issue or even the initial diagnoses
means that they were chosen or are being punished by something. This follows the
thought pattern of self-serving attributional biases in which individuals determine and
interpret the meaning of events around them in a way that best serves them. This includes
placing the cause of positive events on themselves, and the cause of negative events on
others (Bradley, 1978; Roese & Olson, 2007).
Cognitive processes and obsessions. According to modern cognitive theory, all
people form a wide range of mental representations (schema) that work to organize
information about the world and help anticipate future events (Beck & Haigh, 2014).
When an individual encounters a scenario, these automatic processes help to provide
meaning to, or explain, the individual’s experiences. Cognitive biases and distortions are
actually quite common and are believed to underlie clinical issues such as anxiety and
depression (Beck & Haigh, 2014). For example, many individuals with depressive
tendencies engage in catastrophizing, which is the inclination to focus on the most
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negative potential outcome of a situation. Similarly, research suggests that there is some
level of overlap between schizophrenia-spectrum and obsessive-compulsive symptoms
whereby an idea becomes difficult to shake and may lead to seemingly irrational
behavioral responses (Sobin, Blundell, Weiller, Gavigan, Haiman, & Karayiorgou, 2000).
Thus, cognitive failures may be quite common and represent instances when cognitive
processes such as thoughts and memory cease to operate in a functional, productive, and
adaptive manner. Yet, for the schizophrenia-spectrum conditions, there appears to be
additional cognitive errors involved in the formation and maintenance of delusional
beliefs and hallucinatory experiences. Therefore, examining obsessive and compulsive
symptoms and beliefs on a sub-clinical level might further provide insight on how this
and similar phenomena contribute to the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs
and additional beliefs.
One cognitive process, called source monitoring, that has received a good deal of
attention involves the incorrect attribution of the source of material and information
presented to an individual (Arguedas, Stevenson, & Langdon, 2012; Johnson et al., 1993;
McKague, McAnally, Skovron, Bendall, & Jackson, 2012; Woodward & Menon, 2011;
Woodward, Menon, & Whitman, 2007). Source monitoring is linked with memory
(Hekkanen, & McEvoy, 2002; Johnson et al., 1993; Moritz & Woodward, 2006) and can
be studied in situations where individuals are presented with material that can be
interpreted as internally generated (e.g., imagine themselves turning a door knob) or as
externally generated (e.g., viewing the experimenter’s pantomime of turning the door
knob). The individual would later be presented with the stimuli and asked to recall its
source. Individuals with delusions and hallucinations tend to have higher amounts of
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misattributions in such activities (Johnson et al., 1993), especially where they view
internally created experiences as externally generated, a process commonly referred to as
the externalization bias (Bentall, 1990; Woodward & Menon, 2011). Source monitoring
errors may contribute to hallucinatory experiences (Arguedas et al., 2012; Larøi,
Collignon, & Van der Linden, 2005; Woodward & Menon, 2011; Woodward et al.,
2007) as hallucinations can be viewed as internal experiences attributed to external
sources (Woodward & Menon, 2011). Individuals with schizophrenia, when indicating
the confidence of their recall source response, tend to be more confident when they are
making misattributions and exhibit a reduced amount of confidence when they indicate
an accurate response (Moritz & Woodward, 2006). This is a particularly important point
when considering the influence of misattributions, self-certainty, and confidence in
inaccurate or false situations. For example, if an individual sees a stranger multiple times
throughout their day while they are shopping, they may then have the thought (internally
generated) “This person must be following me” which may or may not be true. If this
situation is a coincidence, but the individual strongly believes that the stranger is up to no
good, this can lay the foundation for further alarming thoughts and delusional beliefs
(e.g., “I am in danger”, “It must be the government”). These misattribution errors may be
a potential target for clinical interventions whereby individuals can begin to evaluate the
veracity of their thoughts and perceptions using the principles of cognitive behavioral
theory (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). Understanding the source of information can also
be central to the cognitive aspects of thinking, forming, and constructing belief systems,
thoughts, interactions, and opinions (Johnson et al., 1993). Therefore if faulty notions or
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attribution errors begin to form the basis of these cognitive aspects, delusional and
dysfunctional beliefs may become apparent.
One additional cognitive process termed metacognition has also received attention
as a possible contributor to the schizophrenia-spectrum conditions. Metacognition
involves thinking about our thoughts and cognitions and trying to regulate them (Schraw,
1998). These metacognitive processes have been linked to anxiety (Debbané et al., 2012)
and schizotypy (Debbané et al., 2012; Chan, Spencer, West, Viegas, & Bedwell, 2015).
Specific types of metacognitive beliefs tend to be present in those prone to hallucinations
and exhibiting the externalization bias in source monitoring (Larøi et al., 2005).
Individuals with a diagnosis on the schizophrenia spectrum overall have higher
metacognitive subscale scores related to the beliefs that thoughts are uncontrollable and
dangerous, positive beliefs about worrying (i.e., “I need to worry or I will not be safe”),
and beliefs regarding the need to control their thoughts (Perona‐Garcelán, García‐Montes,
Ductor‐Recuerda, Vallina‐Fernández, Cuevas‐Yust, Pérez‐Álvarez, & ... Gómez‐Gómez,
2012). Metacognitions have also been linked to the prediction of the presence of
delusional ideation (Stainsby & Lovell, 2014) and higher levels of schizotypy (Chan et
al., 2015). Bruno et al. (2012) corroborated other recent research and found that
individuals with schizophrenia tend to have impairments with metacognitions. They also
found that those with delusions had more impairments than others with schizophrenia,
and higher conviction in their delusional ideation themselves. Though research is mixed,
studies have speculated that metacognitive beliefs are more involved in the maintenance
than and not so much the formation of delusional beliefs (Bruno et al., 2012; Goldstone,
Farhall, Thomas, & Ong, 2013)

10

Social and societal experiences/beliefs. The surroundings, social experiences,
and lifestyle of individuals might certainly be very influential to the formation and
maintenance of beliefs. Studies involving delusional beliefs often compare the formation
and maintenance of these beliefs to beliefs such as religion and politics in that all three
have the potential to be formed and maintained in a similar manner. However, religion
and politics are considered to be widely accepted by many societies and do not tend to be
grouped in the realm of delusional beliefs (Roberts, 1991; Maher, 1992; Jaspers, 1968),
though those in the field tend to see delusional beliefs and other beliefs such as religion
on a continuum that also includes normative and accepted beliefs (Smith, Riley, & Peters,
2009; Roberts, 1991).
Research has also shown that individuals with mental health diagnoses, including
diagnoses on the schizophrenia-spectrum, can sometimes feel more empowered and have
more positive outlooks on their diagnoses and life if they feel a sense of influence or
involvement in their community (Lawn, McMillan, Comley, Smith, & Brayley, 2014;
Liberman, 2012). Therefore these individuals might be more proactive in seeking to
understand and cope with their symptoms. This might also be due to supportive social
interactions within their community (Jolley, Ferner, Bebbington, Garety, Dunn, Freeman,
&…Kuipers, 2014).
The importance of social support in the development and consolidation of
delusional beliefs is not well understood. The process of social isolation could
conceivably contribute to consolidation of delusions since the individual may not be able
to gauge the veracity of their personal thoughts with trusted others. The absence of
corrective feedback could foster the drift from consensual reality during formative

11

periods (Saha et al., 2012). However, delusions can certainly develop and persist even in
the presence of stable and supportive social networks that are providing corrective
feedback (Onwumere et al., 2016). So, the quality of social relationships may be an
idiopathic factor that is more relevant in the development of delusions for some
individuals than others.
In keeping with the notion that many factors can possibly contribute to delusional
ideation, the present study sought to identify potential factors that could influence the
formation and maintenance of beliefs, more specifically, delusional ideation and beliefs.
Based on current literature, we have developed 3 a priori hypotheses. Hypothesis 1:
levels of delusional ideation will be significantly related to scores on the cognitiveperceptual (“positive symptoms”) dimension of our schizotypy measure, and
hallucinatory experiences. These relationships would provide evidence for construct
validity (theoretical basis) of our primary measures and would be consistent with robust
findings from the empirical literature. Hypothesis 2: delusional ideation will be predicted
by the presence of greater negative emotions and cognitive biases/errors (i.e., source
monitoring errors, metacognitive beliefs, intolerance of uncertainty, attributional errors,
obsessional beliefs) and unique experiences (physical health problems, social network).
As the literature has shown that the path to the formation and maintenance of delusions is
highly individualized, acknowledging potential phenomena present would provide
foundational ground to further elaborate on specific pathways to delusional belief
formation and maintenance. Certain factors might be present prior to delusion formation,
or occur concurrently, or afterwards in a state of maintenance. Hypothesis 3: sense of
purpose, self-esteem, and positive affect would be predicted by delusional ideation,
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especially expansive delusions. Research Question 1: finally, as an exploratory
component (no directional predictions made) we will examine the extent to which the
variables in this study are related to religiosity, spirituality, personal beliefs, and beliefs
relating to community involvement and connection.
To our knowledge, this is the first time the aforementioned influences have been
studied together. The potential findings from this study could illuminate the processes
underlying the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs and ideation. Clinically,
understanding the role of delusional beliefs and beliefs in diagnoses might ultimately aid
in the development of more effective treatment for individuals with delusional beliefs.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Participants
Data was collected from 200 (males=118, females=81, other gender spectrum=1)
Rowan University undergraduate students (ages 18-36) enrolled in Essentials of
Psychology courses. Within this course, students are required to participate in research as
a way to earn points towards their grade. The students have the choice of participating in
an ongoing university affiliated study or an alternative project involving reading journal
articles and writing a short review. Inclusion criteria for participation in this study
involved being 1) a Rowan University student in an Essentials of Psychology course, and
2) 18 years old or older. A total of seven participants were excluded from data analysis as
they provided responses to open ended items consisting of random strings of letters or
similar response patterns (n=3) or if they did not complete all of the measures due to
technical difficulties with the online platform (n=4). Of our participants, 66% identified
as Caucasian, 15% identified as African American, 8% identified as African American,
6% identified with multiple ethnicities, 3.5% identified as Asian, and 1.5% identified as
ethnicities not listed.
Measures
Participants completed the following measures related to our variables of interest
in this study.
Delusional ideation. Delusional ideation was measured using an expanded
version of the Peters et al., Delusions Inventory (PDI-40; Peters, Joseph, & Garety,
1999). The original PDI-40 contains eight categories of delusions represented through 40
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items, with 5 items per category. The eight categories include delusions of control;
misinterpretations, misidentification, delusions of reference; delusions of persecution;
expansive delusions; delusions concerning various types of influence and primary
delusions; other delusions; simple delusions based on guilt, depersonalization,
hypochondriasis; and thought reading, insertion, echo, and broadcast delusions. For each
item, the participants responded either “yes” or “no” to a question representing a
delusional belief. If “no” is selected, the participant goes on to the next item. Items
include, “Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TV were written especially for
you?” If “yes” is selected, additional sub-items were presented to the participant. The
original PDI-40 has 3 sub-items that involve the distress, preoccupation, and conviction
the participant feels they have in terms of the original item. All three sub-items are
measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. The distress dimension ranges
from “Not at all distressing” to “Very distressing.” The preoccupation dimensions ranges
from “Hardly ever think about it” to “Think about it all the time.” The conviction
dimension ranges from “Don’t believe it’s true” to “Believe it is absolutely true.”
In order to gain a deeper understanding of what these items mean in terms of their
influence on the individual, the authors have amended the PDI-40 by adding additional
sub-items to the 3 original sub-items of the scale. Participants were asked to provide a
response to the sub-items if they select “yes” to the main item. Since beliefs can be
accepted in certain societies and be normative and in others be considered to be odd or
delusional (i.e., certain religious practices, feelings, or political endeavors) we added an
item to examine whether the beliefs or ideas endorsed are representative of a culture to
which the participant belongs. The response choices are yes/no with an option to provide
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the name of the culture. We also asked how much the initial item means and its
importance to the participant on a 5-point Likert scale similar to the 3 sub-items
explained above. We asked a yes/no question regarding whether the participant thinks
that the endorsed belief is something that influences other parts of their life. They are also
provided the option to elaborate on this item through an optional opened ended response
if they would like. The next additional item asked participants if they think that the
endorsed belief arose to explain something around them. This has a yes/no response and a
similar option for elaboration. We also asked whether they think the endorsed belief
happened more recently in their life or when they were younger. This sub-item also has
an optional elaboration response. We then asked if they have shared this belief with
others and how the other person reacted or how participants think others would react.
Response options are yes/no, with an open-ended elaboration response. Finally, we
provided an additional comments option, in case participants wanted to write or describe
anything else about the item. Findings from the expanded portion of this measure are not
included in this study.
The original PDI-40 has good psychometric properties with internal consistency
represented by a Cronbach alpha of 0.88. The original measure also demonstrates testretest reliability (r= 0.82, p< 0.001). Concurrent validity was seen when the measure was
compared to similar measures and criterion validity was also established (Peters et al.,
1999).
Schizotypy. Schizotypy was measured using the Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire-Brief Revised (SPQ-BR; Cohen, Matthews, Najolia, & Brown, 2010).
Seven subscales are incorporated into 32 items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0
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(“Strongly Disagree”) to 4 (“Strongly Agree”). The measure includes three commonly
accepted subscales that mirror the symptom clusters of schizophrenia: positive (i.e., odd
perceptual experiences and magical thinking), negative (i.e., social isolation, constrained
affect), and disorganized (i.e., odd behaviors, disorganized speech and thought content).
Items on the positive domain include “Do you believe in clairvoyance (psychic forces,
fortune telling)?” Negative schizotypy is represented by items such as “I feel very
uncomfortable in social situations involving unfamiliar people.” The disorganized
subscale includes items such as “I sometimes jump quickly from one topic to another
when speaking.” The SPQ-BR demonstrates convergent validity and an internal
reliability of a Cronbach alpha of 0.95 (Cohen et al., 2010).
Hallucinatory-like experiences. The Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale-Revised
(LSHS-R) was regenerated based on a description of items provided by Bentall & Slade
(1985) and included alternate response guidelines. Following the alternate response
guidelines, the version of the LSHS-R used in the present study includes 12 items whose
responses are rated by selecting from the following Likert-style scale: Certainly applies
(5), Possibly applies (4), Unsure (3), Possibly does not apply (2), and Certainly does not
apply (1). Items include “In the past I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice
and then found that no one was there.” The LSHS-R has acceptable internal consistency
with a Cronbach alpha of 0.90 (Fonseca-Pedrero, Lemos-Giráldez, Paino, Sierra-Baigrie,
Villazón-García, García-Portilla González, & Muñiz, 2010).
Mood. The Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995) functioned as a measurement of mood related to depression, anxiety, and stress.
The DASS contains 42 items with 3 subscales (depression, anxiety, stress) that each
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contain 14 items. Responses are in the form of a 4 point Likert scale ranging from 0 (did
not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time.). Items include
“I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things.” Internal consistency of the DASS
subscales are adequate with the following Cronbach’s alphas: 1) depression (0.97), 2)
anxiety (0.92), and 3) stress (0.95). Concurrent validity was also demonstrated (Antony,
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998).
Metacognitions. The Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells &
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) is a 30 item questionnaire regarding metacognitive beliefs.
Each item is scored on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“do not agree”) to 4 (“agree
very much”). There are 5 subscales: cognitive confidence, positive beliefs about
worrying, cognitive self-consciousness, uncontrollability and danger, and need to control
thoughts. Items include “Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future.” The MCQ30 has good-excellent internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.72 to
0.93 for the subscale scores and the total score. Construct and convergent validity were
also demonstrated (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
Demographics and health. In order to gain helpful background information
involving the demographics of each participant, the Demographics and Health
Questionnaire, compiled by the researchers involved in this study, allowed participants to
provide demographic information such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Aspects of their
health were also asked, but not examined, in the current study including items relating to
smoking, family history of mental illnesses, diet, brief information on physical illnesses,
and fitness.
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Items about health attitudes were obtained from the Sample Questionnaire:
Diabetes (Stanford Patient Education Research Center). Although these were written with
a person who has diabetes in mind, the items we selected are general enough to allow us
to gauge the health attitudes of the participants in order to see how variances in responses
to these items potentially relate to the variables in this study. We have also generated six
items involving the number and satisfaction felt by participants regarding their specific
social relationships.
Sense of purpose. This construct was measured using a subscale from the
Lifestyle and Habits Questionnaire-Brief Version (LHQ-B; Dinzeo, Thayasivam, &
Sledjeski, 2014). This questionnaire is broken up into eight lifestyle categories consisting
of health and exercise, psychological health, substance use, nutrition, environmental
concern, social concern, accident prevention, and sense of purpose. Each of these
categories have a total score that matches with a scoring sheet provided to the participants
that rates their scores in each category into bottom, middle, and top ranges based on the
participant’s gender. Sense of purpose was the only subscale from this measure used in
the current study. Items on this subscale include “I find meaning in my life,” “I believe
every life has a purpose,” and “I have a sense of connectedness to something larger than
myself, whether it is organized religion, nature, or social causes.” Responses are
indicated via a 5 point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly
Agree.” Preliminary psychometric data for the sense of purpose subscale was fair at 0.66
(Dinzeo et al., 2014), which slightly improved in the current sample (α= 0.75).
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Quality of life beliefs. The WHOQOL-SRPB (Saxena, 2006) measured quality of
life factors viewed through the frame of spirituality, religiousness, and personal beliefs. It
consists of 32 items where each participant can choose how they would like to answer
each item. That is, they can decide whether they view their beliefs from a place of
spirituality, religiousness, or personal beliefs. Saxena (2006) noted that they added four
additional items that allow the participant to express their level of spirituality,
religiousness, and personal beliefs. These four items are added to the beginning of the
questionnaire bringing the total number of items to 36. Items include “To what extent do
you have feelings of inspiration/excitement in your life?” Cronbach’s alpha for this
measure was 0.91 (Saxena, 2006). The present study only utilized the four additional
items assessing the extent of endorsement of spirituality, religiosity, and personal beliefs.
5 conditions (source monitoring). We have adapted a source monitoring activity
presented in a study by Larøi et al. (2005), which involves 5 different types of conditions.
The conditions include a verbal phase in which the participant listens to an action phrase,
a visual phase in which the experimenter carries out an action in the item, an imagined
visual phase in which the participant imagines the experimenter carrying out an action in
the item, a motor phase where the participant completes the action present in the item,
and an imagined motor phases in which the participant imagine themselves carrying out
the action present in the item. In total for the original activity, there were 60 items present
in the study or memorization phase, which were divided into 15 blocks each containing 4
items. After every 4 items, the condition changes and this is explained at each time to the
participant. Each condition has 12 items. Two action and two imagined conditions cannot
directly follow each other, so the order we have chosen is verbal, imagined motor, visual,
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imagined visual, and motor. The order of the conditions stayed the same but we have
randomized the items within each condition in order to create 3 different versions to
lessen fatigue and aspects of order effect. The recall phase consisted of the participant
going through items that presented the phrases in the study phase randomly mixed with
an additional 60 phrases, bringing the total item number to 120. The participant selected
whether they felt each phrase in each item was “New” or “Old.” If they believed it was
old, then they indicated what condition they believed it was from. For all items, the
participant provided a confidence level of their overall response. The measure that we
adapted from Larøi et al. (2005) contained additional aspects that we felt were not
required for the purposes of our study. Therefore, we did not use such aspects.
Due to time constraints and other factors, we chose to shorten the 5 conditions
activity. The basic frame described above still stands with amended numbers. There were
still 5 different types of conditions, with an amended total of 40 items presented in the
study or memorization phases, which were divided up into 10 blocks that each contained
4 items. As stated above, after every 4 items the conditions changes. Each condition now
has 8 instead of 12 items. The revised recall phase contained the 40 study and 40
additional phrases, bringing the total to 80 items. Response options remained the same.
Total scores of correctness for the old/new items and for the correct attribution of sources
were created. Due to the highly individualized nature of each item, and the notion that
each item response does not have to be related to any other item because of the nature of
the study phase and recall phase, there is no psychometric information provided for this
measure.
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Cognition and explanatory styles. The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire for
Psychosis (Peters, Mortiz, Schwannauer, Wiseman, Greenwood, Scott & …Garety, 2014)
is a questionnaire designed to examine cognitive (thinking/thoughts/interpretations)
biases that may exist and contribute to reasoning which, in turn can contribute to the
formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. There are 30 statements, each with 3
response choices that represent different cognitive biases (intentionalising,
catastrophizing, dichotomous thinking, jumping to conclusions, emotional reasoning).
Fifteen items fall into the theme of anomalous perceptions, and 15 are related to
threatening events. There are 6 responses per bias. The responses that go along with the
statements are rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 3 (1= absence of bias; 2= presence of bias
with some qualification; and 3= presence of bias). A total score for each theme and bias,
and a total overall score were generated. Items include “Imagine that the phone rings.
When you answer, the other party hangs up.” Responses this particular item are a) “I
wonder if there’s something suspicious about this”, b) “somebody is definitely checking
up on me”, and c) “someone’s probably got the wrong number.” This measure has
excellent psychometrics with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 representing internal
consistency and test-retest scores of 0.96 (Peters et al., 2014).
Obsessive-compulsive thoughts and beliefs. The Obsessive-Compulsive
Inventory-short form (OCI-R: Foa, Huppert, Leiberg, Langner, Kichic, Hajack, &
Salkovskis, 2002) is an 18 item questionnaire that provides statements and asks the
participant to indicate to what level were they distressed or bothered by the matter in the
statement. Responses ranged from 0=not at all to 4= extremely, on a 5-point Likert scale.
Items include “I check things more often than necessary.” The OCI-R has demonstrated
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good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent and divergent validity
(Foa et al., 2002).
Self-esteem, wellbeing. The Flourishing Scale (Diener, Wirtz, Tov, Kim-Prieto,
Choi, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2010) is an 8 item measure that provides statements for
the participants to rate on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The
statements involve how the individual feels about themselves, their self-esteem, and
sense of purpose. Items include “I am engaged and interested in my daily activities” and
“People respect me.” This measure has demonstrated very good internal consistency with
a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87 (Diener et al., 2010).
Uncertainty. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte,
Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994) is a 27 item measure with responses ranging from 1 (not
characteristic of me at all) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me) on a 5-point Likert scale.
Items include “Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.” Internal consistency
was excellent with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94. Test-retest reliability was shown to have a
coefficient of r=0.74 (Buhr & Dugas, 2002).
Civic responsibility. We compiled an amended version of the Civic
Responsibility Questionnaire (Furco, Muller, & Ammon, 1998) in order to attempt to
gauge participant’s beliefs about being involved in their community and if their
involvement has positive or negative influence on their life. The original Civic
Responsibility Questionnaires comes in 3 levels that correspond to 3 different schooling
levels (elementary, middle, and high school). We have combined the 3 levels to form one
questionnaire of 34 items. Responses are gauged on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Items include “I feel like I am part of a

23

community.” This questionnaire appears to be used typically in primary and secondary
educational settings. Because of this, no psychometric information could be found for this
measure. Any findings relating to this measure will be considered exploratory.
Affect. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) is a 20 item measure that includes 10 positive emotion/feelings words
and 10 negative emotion/feelings words. Participants are asked to rate how much the
emotion/feelings word applies to them in the present moment based off of a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Items include
“Interested” and “Upset.” The measure has demonstrated very good reliability and
validity with a Cronbach’s alpha being 0.86 to 0.90 for positive words and 0.84 to 0.87
for negative words (Watson et al., 1988).
Memory and cognition. In order to assist in determining the value of the
responses from the source monitoring (5 conditions) activity, we have chosen to include
the Extended Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (ECFQ; Das-Smaal, deJong, &
Koopmans, 1993), which assesses memory through a 35 item questionnaire with
responses on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). The measure, created
by Das-Smaal et al., (1993), combines a number of existing measures including
Broadbent et al.’s Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (1982), Hermann & Neisser’s (1978)
Inventory of Everyday Memory Experiences, and Reason & Mycielska’s (1982) Error
Proneness Questionnaire. This will be used to interpret the participant’s capacity for
working and recent memory, and error proneness. Ideally, responses on this measure will
let us know the participant’s self-reported baseline of their memory abilities. For
example, if a participant’s responses to this questionnaire indicate that they do not have
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any self-reported memory issues and if the same participant has a multitude of errors on
the 5 conditions recall, we might be able to consider the recall results as more towards
schizophrenia-spectrum symptomology, rather than attribute them to solely memory
errors. However, this will be taken as a guiding point for interpretation and not an
absolute final statement on the participant’s memory and performance on the source
monitoring recall. All other variables will also be taken into account and will also serve
as a guide to interpreting the source monitoring (5 conditions) results. Items include “Do
you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to the other?” Cronbach’s
alpha for this measure is 0.88. However, the Das-Smaal et al. suggest more studies should
be done involving the psychometric properties.
Procedures
This study has been approved by Rowan University’s Institutional Review Board.
Participants met with a trained lab member from Rowan University’s Schizophrenia
Spectrum Lab to complete the study in a face-to-face session. Upon arriving at the
location and at the time that was selected by both groups online via Rowan University’s
SONA system, the lab member explained this study and the consent procedures to the
participant. The information on the informed consent form was read, and there were
opportunities for the potential participant to ask any questions they might have regarding
the study and informed consent form and obtain answers from the researcher. It was also
made clear to the potential participant that they were able to ask questions regarding their
rights and elements of the study at any point in time. The participant was also informed
that they were free to discontinue their participation in this study at any time, but would
only receive the research credit for the completion of this study in its entirety. After this,
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if the participant chose to participate in the study, they signed and dated the informed
consent form. The lab member present also signed and dated this same form and a
reproduction of the informed consent was given to the participant for their records.
After consent was obtained, the lab member guided the participant through the
series of questionnaires and activities. A number of questionnaires were provided online
to participants via the Qualtrics platform in an effort to conserve paper, but were
completed in front of a lab member during the session. The remaining questionnaires, the
activity, and consent documents were completed on paper. Three different versions, each
containing a different order of the various assessments, were created in order to address
possible confounding patterns of response fatigue and order effects.
Statistical Analysis
All data was evaluated prior to analysis. Instances of potential random
responding, or outlier responses, were also evaluated. Data distributions were examined
for normality (skew/kurtosis <2 for parametric tests). The existence of potential
confounds related to sample characteristics such as gender and ethnicity were evaluated
prior to analyses using independent sample t-tests and oneway ANOVAs for variables
that were normally distributed and the Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis test for
non-normally distributed variables.
Pearson and Spearman correlations were used in order to examine the
relationships between delusional ideation, positive schizotypy, and hallucinatory
experiences (Hypothesis 1).
Data reduction via a principle component analysis (PCA) was conducted in order
to condense the large amount of variables of interests in Hypothesis 2. Prior to
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conducting the PCA, all relevant variable scores were standardized using z-scores.
Additionally, source monitoring scores were evaluated using the scores from the ECFQ
in order to determine whether source monitoring attribution errors were due to general
memory impairments. Pearson correlations were used to examine this potential
relationship and yielded no significant correlations. This may suggest that errors on our
source monitoring measure may not have been due to general memory impairments. Due
to this, source monitoring variables were added into the PCA after being standardized.
Source monitoring total scores, collapsing across the five experimental conditions, were
entered into the PCA. Additionally, in regards to physical health information no
participant endorsed the presence of a type one or type two diabetes diagnoses. Similarly,
asthma was infrequently endorsed (n=32). Thus, diabetes and asthma status were not
included in the PCA.
A series of hierarchal linear regression models predicting overall and subtypes of
delusional ideation (Hypothesis 2) and predicting sense of purpose, self-esteem, and
positive affect (Hypothesis 3) were created. Gender and ethnicity were included in the
first step of each model as a control. Components from the PCA (Hypothesis 2) or
delusional ideation subscales (Hypothesis 3) were included in the second step of these
models.
Research Question 1 was examined using modified versions of the hierarchal
linear regression models that were used to test Hypothesis 2. Gender and ethnicity
remained in the first step of these models as control variables. Normative beliefs
(religiosity, spirituality, personal beliefs, and community involvement beliefs) were
included in the second step. Components from the PCA were included in the third step.
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Chapter 4
Results
All data was evaluated for normality and differences in gender and ethnicity were
controlled for during analyses. The majority of data were normally distributed with some
exceptions. Persecutory delusions, delusions of thought, anxiety, and health interference
were skewed and demonstrated kurtosis. Other delusions, depression, health worries, and
the total score from the DASS measure had high kurtosis. Means, standard deviations
(SD), number of items, gender and ethnicity differences, and internal consistency
represented by Cronbach’s alpha are presented in Table 1. From the PCA components,
health concerns and source monitoring were skewed and demonstrated kurtosis. The
cognitive-emotional and friend component from the PCA had high kurtosis. Amongst the
PCA groupings only health concerns had significant gender differences via the KruskalWallis Test with females reporting higher concern for their health (p<.001). No other
gender or ethnicity differences were found amongst the PCA variables.
As presented in Table 1, some measures included in the current study have lower
than recommended levels of Cronbach’s alpha being below a 0.70 (Tavakol & Dennick,
2011). The PDI-40, which was our measure of delusional ideation, has an adequate total
item alpha of 0.76. However, each individual sub-type of delusional ideation has an alpha
lower than 0.6. This may be due to 1) the small number of items in each subscale (5
items), 2) infrequency endorsement rates of delusional ideation in a college sample either
due to social desirability or prior to onset of delusional ideation, 4) the dichotomous
nature of the items, and 5) the notion that not all aspects of a given subtype of delusional
ideation needs to be related and endorsed together. Interestingly the authors of the PDI-
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40 have stated that the goal of their development of this measure was not for high internal
consistency values to be present amongst potential subscales as this may only act to limit
the conceptualization and nuanced nature of delusional ideation (Peters et al., 1999;
Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). Alphas for the CBQ-P subscales were also below
the recommended levels at lower than 0.46. The alpha for the total score of the CBQ-P is
0.74. For the conceptual reasons mentioned above, we decided to include findings from
these subscales in our analyses with an advisement of extra caution in any relating
interpretations. For both of these measures the alpha at the total score levels were
adequate. This further contributed to our decision to include the subscales in analyses
with caution advised in any interpretations.
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Table 1
Means, SD, items, internal consistency, and gender (independent samples t-test)/
ethnicity (oneway ANOVA) differences amongst measures
Items
Mean
SD
α
Gender/Ethnicity Differences
Delusional Ideation
40
4.85
3.70
0.76
AA>C, p=.032
Delusions of Control
5
0.55
0.69
0.03
F>M, p=.045
Delusions of Reference
5
1.41
0.92
0.19
C<AA & A<AA, Mu p=.041
Persecutory Delusions
5
0.23
0.57
0.45
Expansive Delusions
5
1.03
1.17
0.56
C<H, AA, O, p=.014
Primary Delusions
5
0.70
0.77
0.11 C<AA,O; O>H, AA, A, Mu, p=.003
Other Delusions
5
0.44
0.77
0.44
F>M, p=.004**
Simple Delusions
5
0.31
0.53
0.01
Delusions of Thought
5
0.19
0.44
0.09
Schizotypy
32
1.57
0.63
0.93
Positive
14
1.22
0.66
0.87
Interpersonal
10
1.75
0.78
0.86
Disorganized
8
1.96
0.87
0.89
Hallucinatory Experiences
12
2.30
0.70
0.84
DASS
42
0.50
0.57
0.96
F>M, p=.025**
Depression
14
0.43
0.54
0.94
Anxiety
14
0.41
0.44
0.88
Stress
14
0.66
0.58
0.92
F>M, p<.001
Metacognitions
30
2.08
0.43
0.88
Cog. Confidence
6
1.78
0.56
0.79
F>M, p=.013
Pos. beliefs about worry
6
1.75
0.62
0.85
Cog. Self-conscious
6
2.74
0.62
0.81
Uncontrol & Danger
6
2.05
0.83
0.89
F>M, p=.001
Need to control
6
2.06
0.58
0.66
Demographics and Health Questionnaire
Health Worries
4
2.98
3.73
0.89
Health Interference
4
1.02
1.90
0.79
Number of friends*
1
11.63
26.43
Satisfaction with friends
1
78.65
22.62
Number of close family
1
6.93
5.77
Satisfaction with family
1
81.46
23.09
Partner Status
1
0.40
0.49
Satisfaction with partner
1
67.82
28.96
Lifestyle and Habits
Sense of Purpose
3
4.03
0.91
0.75
Normative Beliefs
Religiosity
1
2.63
1.14
C<H,AA; AA>Mu, p=.001
Spirituality
1
2.75
1.16
C<H,AA; AA>Mu, p=.002
Personal Beliefs
1
3.65
1.00
Civic Responsibility
35
4.03
0.79
0.96
Source Monitoring
Old/New
80
1.59
0.33
Source
80
1.27
0.37
Cognitive Biases
30
1.45
0.20
0.74
Catastrophizing
6
1.48
0.28
0.38
Dichotomous Thinking
6
1.41
0.32
0.41
AA>C; O>C, A, p=.014
Jumping to conclusions
6
1.62
0.32
0.46
F>M, p=.005
Emotional reasoning
6
1.35
0.28
0.36
C<H, AA, p<.001
Intentionalising
6
1.38
0.24
0.36
Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms
18
0.92
0.72
0.92
AA>C, H, A, p=.017
Intolerance of Uncertainty
27
1.99
0.71
0.95
F>M, p<.001
Self-esteem
8
5.80
0.80
0.88
Affect
20
Positive Affect
10
2.69
0.77
0.91
M>F, p=.041
Negative Affect
10
1.74
0.74
0.91
F>M, p=.009
Extended Cognitive Failures
35
1.64
0.52
0.93
Note. *n=196, **Mann Whitney U-test statistic, M=Male, F=female, C=Caucasian, H=Hispanic, AA=African American, A=Asian,
O=other ethnicity not listed Note: M=Male, F=female, C=Caucasian, H=Hispanic, AA=African American, A=Asian, O=other
ethnicity not listed, Mu=multiple ethnicities endorsed.

30

For our first hypothesis, overall delusional ideation was positively correlated to
hallucinatory experiences (r=.36, p<.001), positive (r=.48, p<.001), interpersonal (r=.14,
p=.043), and disorganized (r=.42, p<.001) schizotypy. Hallucinatory experiences were
positively correlated with positive (r=.62, p<.001), interpersonal (r=.34, p<.001), and
disorganized (r=.46, p<.001) schizotypy. Table 2 includes correlations amongst
delusional ideation subscales, schizotypy, and hallucinatory experiences.

Table 2
Excerpted Pearson and Spearman (in italics) correlations amongst delusional ideation
subscales, schizotypy, hallucinatory experiences, and overall delusional ideation

Del. of Control
Del. of Reference
Persecutory del.
Expansive del.
Primary del.
Other del.
Simple del.
Del. of Thought

Positive
Schizotypy
.39***
.39***
.31***
.24***
.23***
.37***
.24***
.29***

Interpersonal
Schizotypy
.19**
.21**
.06
-.07
-.03
.07
.23***
.15*

Disorganized
Schizotypy
.32***
.39***
.30***
.21**
.11
.24***
.28***
.35***

Schizotypy
Total
.34***
.39***
.28***
.15*
.13
.28***
.30***
.31***

Hallucinatory
Experiences Total
.32***
.37***
.16*
.17*
.22***
.18*
.19**
.24***

Delusions
Total
.57***
.69***
.49***
.72***
.63***
.57***
.50***
.50***

Note. ***p<.001 **p<.010 *p=<.05, del.=delusions.

We conducted a PCA in order for data reduction purposes for Hypothesis 2 as this
method is typically conducive for data reduction purposes as it allows for multiple
variables of interest to be groups into meaningful groupings (Joliffe & Morgan, 1992).
Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values indicated that the PCA
was an appropriate method of examining these variables. Varimax rotation was applied in
order to derive well-defined components (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Eight components
emerged from the PCA with an Eigen value higher than 1. The total variance explained
by these components are presented in Table 3 and the varimax rotations are presented in
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Table 4. The first component contained many aspects relating to cognitions, emotions,
and general mental health symptomology (cognitive-emotional). The second component
related to health worries and interference in activities (health concerns), while the third
component contained our source monitoring elements. The fourth component involved
an individual’s partner status and satisfaction with this status. The fifth component
involved confidence in cognitions, and cognitive biases relating to intentions and
emotions (self-based reasoning). The sixth component included cognitive biases such as
dichotomous thinking, jumping to conclusions, and catastrophizing. The seventh
component involved the number of friends and the related satisfaction, while the eighth
component contained the number of family members and the related satisfaction.

Table 3
Total variance explained from 8 PCA components

Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Total
7.12
1.99
1.89
1.65
1.46
1.28
1.05
1.03

Initial Eigenvalues
% of
Cumulative
Variance %
27.39
27.39
7.64
35.02
7.28
42.31
6.33
48.64
5.62
54.26
4.93
59.19
4.02
63.21
3.94
67.15

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
Total Variance %
7.12
27.39
27.39
1.99
7.64
35.02
1.89
7.28
42.31
1.65
6.33
48.64
1.46
5.62
54.26
1.28
4.93
59.19
1.05
4.02
63.21
1.03
3.94
67.15
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Rotation Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
Total Variance %
5.54
21.32
21.32
2.12
8.15
29.47
1.93
7.43
36.90
1.87
7.17
44.07
1.57
6.02
50.10
1.55
5.94
56.04
1.51
5.79
61.83
1.38
5.32
67.15

33
-.20
-.10

-.19
-.25
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-.16
.12
.17
.14

.13
.46
.19
.15
.32
.38

-.15

Rotated component matrix
CognitiveHealth
emotional
concerns
.14
.82
.33
.79
.11
0.77
.46
.73
.69
.42
.66
.10
.65
.23
.62
-.13
.59
-.25
.45
.27
.80
.35
.79

Measure and variable
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IOU)
Stress (DASS)
Need to control thought (MCQ-30)
Anxiety (DASS)
Obsessive Compulsive Symptomology (OCI-R)
Depression (DASS)
Uncontrollability and danger (MCQ-30)
Negative Affect (PANAS)
Cognitive self-consciousness (MCQ-30)
Positive beliefs about worrying (MCQ-30)
Health Interference (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Health Worries (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Old/New source monitoring (5 conditions)
Source correctness (5 conditions)
Satisfaction with partner (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Partner status (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Intentionalising (CBQ-P)
Cognitive confidence (MCQ-30)
Emotional Reasoning (CBQ-P)
Dichotomous thinking (CBQ-P)
Jumping to conclusions (CBQ-P)
Catastrophizing (CBQ-P)
Number of family members (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Satisfaction with family members (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Number of friends (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Satisfaction with friends (Demographics and Health Questionnaire)
Note: Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization, rotation converged in 9 iterations

Rotated component matrix for PCA components

Table 4

-.12

.96
.95

.22

Source
monitoring

-.12
.22
-.18
.38

-.21
-.20

.87
.84

-.11

-.15
-.11

Partner

-.19

.17
.36

.82
.53
.50

.12

.14

.20

.19

Self-biased
reasoning

.16
-.23
.25
.74
.44
.39
-.20
.24

-.13

.40

.36

Cognitive
biases
.15
.12
-.12
.12
.16

.83
.74
.10
.25

-.13

.21

.14

.14
-.14

-.10

Family

.14
.76
.51

-.11
-.32
-.25
.17

-.16

-.20
.21
.29

-.20

-.16
.12

Friends

A total of nine hierarchal linear regression models predicting overall and the eight
sub-types of delusional ideation were examined for Hypothesis 2. Table 5 presents
coefficient data for the nine regressions. The model predicting overall delusional ideation
was significant. Both gender and ethnicity R2= .03, F(2, 197) = 3.29, p=.039 and the
second step containing the eight components from the PCA R2= .10, F(8, 189) = 2.60,
p=.010 significantly contributed to this prediction.
Delusions of control, delusions of reference, and simple delusions were
significantly predicted by the eight components (R2= .120, F(8, 189) = 3.296, p=.002;
R2= .111, F(8, 189) = 3.013, p=.003; & R2= .101, F(8, 189) = 2.670, p=.008,
respectively). The eight components were approaching significance in the prediction of
persecutory delusional ideation R2= .071, F(8, 189) = 1.821, p=.075. The prediction of
expansive delusions and primary delusions were not predicted by the eight components.
Other delusions were predicted by gender and ethnicity only R2= .076, F(2, 197) =
8.148, p<.001.
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Note. *p< .05

Coefficient data for hierarchal linear regressions predicting delusional ideation by gender/ethnicity and PCA components

Table 5

For our third hypothesis, three hierarchal linear regression models predicting
positive affect, self-esteem, and sense of purpose by delusional ideation were examined
while controlling for gender and ethnicity differences. Table 6 presents the specific
factors that significantly and independently contributed to the predictions of positive
affect, self-esteem, and sense of purpose. The model predicting positive affect was
approaching significance. The delusional ideation subscale step was approaching
significance R2= .075, F(8, 189) = 1.981, p=.051. Despite the gender and ethnicity step
not being significant, gender contributed to the prediction of positive affect. Self-esteem
was significantly predicted by the delusional ideation subscales step R2= .227, F(8, 189)
= 6.945, p<.001. Sense of purpose was significantly predicted by the delusional ideation
subscales step R2= .222, F(8, 189) = 6.939, p<.001.

Table 6
Coefficient data for Hypothesis 3 hierarchal linear regression models
Hierarchal linear regression coefficient summary
Positive affect
Self-esteem
β
t
β
t

Sense of purpose
β
t

Gender
Ethnicity

-0.148
-0.04

-2.077*
-0.557

0.002
-0.002

0.025
-0.033

0.09
0.111

1.259
1.553

Del. Control
Del. Reference
Persecutory del.
Expansive del.
Primary del.
Other del.
Simple del.
Del. Thought

-0.054
-0.115
-0.145
0.193
0.097
0.029
-0.047
0.075

-0.699
-1.401
-1.726
2.238*
1.164
0.355
-0.606
0.95

-0.077
-0.155
-0.249
0.252
0.101
0.071
-0.236
0.007

-1.083
-2.031*
-3.186**
3.145**
1.31
0.919
-3.255**
0.088

-0.053
-0.15
-0.18
0.297
0.23
-0.01
-0.187
-0.001

-0.751
-2.000*
-2.330*
3.761**
3.030**
-0.134
-2.608*
-0.012

Model
Step 1

Step 2

Note. *p<.05, ** p<.003
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For Research Question 1, normative beliefs were added into the regressions
models presented for Hypothesis 2. Table 7 presents coefficient data for the nine
regression models. The model predicting overall delusional ideation was significant
including the first step with gender and ethnicity R2= .032, F(2, 197) = 3.288, p=.039;
the second step including normative beliefs R2= .108, F(4, 193) = 6.083, p<.001, and the
third step including the eight components from the PCA R2= .082, F(8, 185) = 2.439,
p=.016.
Delusions of control were predicted by normative beliefs (R2= .062, F(4, 193) =
3.266, p=.013) and the eight components from the PCA R2= .104, F(8, 185) = 2.959,
p=.004. Delusions of reference were significantly predicted by the third step including the
eight components R2= .100, F(8, 185) = 2.680, p=.008. The model predicting
persecutory delusions was not significant. Only the second step containing normative
beliefs significantly predicted both expansive delusions R2= .133, F(4, 193) = 7.556,
p<.001 and primary delusions R2= .198, F(4, 193) = 12.167, p<.001. Other delusions
were significantly predicted by gender and ethnicity R2= .076, F(2, 197) = 8.148,
p<.001 and normative beliefs R2= .045, F(4, 193) = 2.449, p=.048.
Normative beliefs were approaching a statistically significant prediction of simple
delusions R2= .045, F(4, 193) = 2.295, p=.061. Only the eight components significantly
contributed to this prediction R2= .077, F(8, 185) = 2.044, p=.044. Delusions of thought
were predicted by only the eight components of the PCA in the third step of the model
R2= .077, F(8, 185) = 2.002, p=.048.
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Note. *p<.05, **p<.001
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Coefficient data for hierarchal linear regressions predicting delusional ideation by gender/ethnicity, normative beliefs, and PCA
components

Table 7

Chapter 5
Discussion
The present study examined the potential contribution from a number of likely
candidate processes in the formation and maintenance of delusional ideation and beliefs.
Mixed support for the three over-arching study hypotheses was found. Possible evidence
for the existence of idiopathic pathways to belief formation and maintenance will be
discussed below. Due to the complex and large number of variables of interest in this
study, the discussion of findings is organized according to the order of hypotheses.
Interpretation regarding the PCA can be found primarily with Hypothesis 2 and Research
Question 1.
Hypothesis 1
Our first hypothesis involved examining the sub-clinical schizophrenia spectrum
symptomology scores (i.e., delusional ideation, the cognitive-perceptual domain or
“positive symptoms” of schizotypy, and hallucinatory experiences) and their relationships
with each other. Scores from the schizotypy subscales, hallucinatory experiences, and
delusional ideation were positively associated with each other, providing support for the
construct validity of these measurements that are each intended to represent different
facets of sub-clinical schizophrenia-spectrum phenomena. While scores on these
measures cannot forecast the actual transition to a clinical schizophrenia-spectrum
diagnosis, they are viewed as vulnerability/risk indicators (Verdoux & van Os., 2002).
Examining sub-clinical symptomology in non-clinical samples (such as college students)
has the benefit of allowing researchers to study spectrum-phenomenon without the
confounding effects of medication (Wang, Hu, Guo, Wu, Li, & Zhao, 2013). This type of
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research helps to establish timelines of symptom development. This may be especially
true for the study of delusional beliefs since college is often seen as a transition towards
adulthood where an individual may be examining and developing various beliefs (Arnett,
1997; Arnett, 2000).
Our findings related to these symptom measures suggest that the PDI-40, SPQBR, and LSHS-R might be beneficial in settings where there is a need to measure
psychosis-risk over time (e.g., college campuses). For example, the use of these
measures as a screening tool, or to create a baseline for symptom severity, may help tailor
services and preventative strategies. In addition, the scores on the other symptom
measures included in the current study demonstrated good internal reliability and
directional associations that are conceptually consistent with the constructs that they are
intended to measure (e.g., DASS anxiety, Negative Affect, and OCS scores are all highly
correlated).
Hypothesis 2
Our a priori predictions regarding the specific factors predicting delusional
development were partially confirmed, although with notable exceptions. Specifically,
Hypothesis 2 examined delusional ideation being predicted by the presence of greater
negative emotions and cognitive biases/errors (i.e., source monitoring errors,
metacognitive beliefs, intolerance of uncertainty, attributional errors, obsessional beliefs)
and unique experiences (physical health problems, social network). The first principle
component, cognitive-emotional, significantly predicted overall delusional ideation as
well as delusions of control (i.e., that others control the individual, that the individual is
not in control of themselves), delusions of reference (i.e., that external stimuli are

40

directed towards the individual), and other delusions (i.e., those involving somatic
aspects, influence and perceptions of others). Therefore, as we anticipated, scores on
measure of negative emotion (e.g., DASS, PANAS-negative affect) and certain cognitive
tendencies (i.e., obsessive symptoms, intolerance of uncertainty, several meta-cognitive
processes) predicted the severity of certain delusional domains.
These findings suggest that the variables with the cognitive-emotional component
are etiologically significant contributors to delusional beliefs. For example, it may be
possible that risk for delusional ideation (especially involving external control/influence)
increases in the presence of heightened negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty, and
specific metacognitive tendencies. However, not all individuals who experience these
cognitive-emotional symptoms would be expected to develop delusional beliefs. Thus,
there is likely an underlying “vulnerability” element such as schizotaxia, which is the
putative biological risk variable believed to underlie schizophrenia, that interacts with
these cognitive-emotional elements and are necessary for the manifestation of delusions
(Meehl, 1990; Lenzenweger, 2006). This etiological view is largely consistent with
Roberts who theorized that individuals settle on the delusional explanations, even if they
are distressing, in an effort to explain anomalous or odd experiences (1991; 1992). Those
who are more inclined towards having an intolerance of uncertainty may be more readily
open to such explanations in order to relieve any tension or anxiety relating to the
unknown (Maher, 1992). This may result in an individual accepting an explanation
towards a perceived external control source, which may lay the foundation for delusional
beliefs in order to reduce any uncertainty that they may experience.
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Our specific findings regarding “health-concerns” and paranoid ideation (i.e.,
persecutory delusions) can also be interpreted within a possible etiological framework.
For example, at-risk individuals who are experiencing ambiguous internal (health-related)
symptoms may be compelled to develop an explanation of their symptoms, even if it is
not wholly consistent with consensual reality. This would be in line with research relating
to the explanatory and meaning making aspects of the formation of delusional ideation
(Maher 1992; Roberts, 1991, 1992). For example, this could represent a self-serving
attributional bias by attributing negative internal states to circumstances outside of
themselves (Bradley, 1978; Roese & Olson, 2007). Thus, certain individuals may be
more prone to attributing their health to outside sources as a way of reducing uncertainty.
Stated another way, the persecutory beliefs held by these individuals may act as a
protective factor against even more anxiety-provoking issues related to health and
mortality that they feel helpless/unable to address. Interestingly, our findings suggest that
other delusions involving delusions relating to the influence of others and somatic
concerns may also follow a similar pattern as delusions relating to external experience.
Delusions of reference may also represent features of externalization as an
individual may feel better to place beliefs on outside factors that are out of one’s control,
rather than to add to potential anxiety provoking internal thoughts and processes.
Additionally, this may also reflect the notion of aberrant salience. Delusions of reference
may be viewed as self-referential as the individual may find stimuli to be particularly
salient to themselves, while others may view the same stimuli as neutral (Howes &
Kapur, 2009; Cicero, Docherty, Becker, Martin, & Kerns, 2015). Thus, an individual who
endorses delusions of reference may be more prone to forming beliefs in order to explain
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particularly salient and perhaps even anomalous experiences around them in order to
make sense of them.
Surprisingly, expansive and primary delusional ideation were not predicted by
any of the eight PCA components (cognitive emotional, health concerns, source
monitoring, partner, self-biased reasoning, cognitive biases, family, friends). This
suggests that subtypes of delusional beliefs involving grandiose themes may not be
related to the constructs/assessments included in the PCA, at least in our current sample.
It is possible that these beliefs may be influenced by different cognitive processes or
aspects of symptomology or that the use of aggregate PCA variables may have obscured
the possible contributions of specific processes related to expansive and primary
delusions. Yet the lack of empirical relationships may actually add credence to the notion
of idiopathic and individualized factors contributing to the development and maintenance
of delusional ideation. For example, there is a high probability that psychological factors
influence the development of grandiose beliefs. The fact that we did not identify the
influential elements for these two clinically relevant delusion subtypes strongly suggests
that we did not have the correct assessments, or methods, to reveal the unique
characteristics associated with those specific delusional beliefs across individuals.
Hypothesis 3
Our third a priori hypothesis predicted that sense of purpose, self-esteem, and
positive affect would be predicted by delusional ideation, especially expansive delusions.
As anticipated, expansive delusions predicted sense of purpose and improved self-esteem
(with positive affect approaching significance). This is consistent with a portion of the
literature examining the adaptive functions of delusional beliefs (Roberts, 1991; Jolley, et
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al., 2006; Martens, 2012; Sundag, Lincoln, Hartman, & Mortiz, 2015). In fact, this
particular type of delusion may serve as a protective factor against low self-esteem and
negative life events (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). The content of specific types of
delusional ideation may directly influence self-esteem or possibly present an internal selfreflection of the individual (i.e., delusional content representing a kernel of truth;
Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). In particular, expansive or grandiose content may act to
boost self-esteem or perhaps reflect the individual’s already existing high sense of self. It
is also important to consider the notion that expansive and primary delusional ideation
may be viewed as beliefs relating to internal processes, not due to the influence of
external sources. Although, we did not find evidence for specific internal processes using
our own PCA groupings.
We also found strong evidence that delusions of reference, persecutory delusions,
and simple delusions were related to lower levels of sense of purpose and self-esteem.
This may suggest that the content of the actual delusional belief is related to how an
individual views themselves, with negative content being linked to negative selfcognitions (Collett, Pugh, Waite, & Freeman, 2016).
The finding that influences on self-esteem and sense of purpose depend on the
content of delusional ideation may indicate a potentially important factor in the formation
and maintenance of delusional beliefs. An individual’s view of themselves may be
reflected within the content of their delusional belief and delusional ideation may inform
an individual’s sense of self. The content of both internally (expansive, primary
delusions) and externally (delusions of reference, persecutory delusions, simple
delusions) based delusional ideation may also be symbolic of an evaluation or self-view
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of powerlessness and a perceived lack of autonomy (Martens, 2012). Thus, individuals
scoring high on these PDI scales may have generated beliefs (unverifiable by others)
relating to their own existing self-view involving special powers and abilities. These
inherent perceptions and interpretations of surroundings and experiences may further
guide the development and maintenance of delusional ideation as the resulting beliefs
serve a purpose for the individual.
Research Question 1: Exploratory
As our Research Question 1 is exploratory in nature, we did not make any
directional predictions relating to relationships amongst our variables of interest and
normative beliefs (religiosity, spirituality, personal beliefs, and community involvement
beliefs). We found mixed results in regards to normative beliefs and delusional ideation.
Spirituality contributed to the prediction of both overall delusional ideation and delusions
of reference, while the cognitive-emotional component was no longer significant. This
may be because elements of spirituality may be a more salient predictor of these types of
delusions then the cognitive-emotional component. Delusions of control were predicted
by both spirituality and the cognitive-emotional component. This is an intriguing finding
that includes the internal characteristics of the individual (i.e., scores on the cognitiveemotional variables) as well as their openness to the influence of factors “greater than”
the self. The common theme may be a fear of loss of control or autonomy. The
individual may find these delusional beliefs regarding loss of control as both beneficial
and relieving as responsibility may be designated to factors outside of the self, but also
anxiety provoking as the individual may feel that their experiences do not line up with
their existing spiritual beliefs.
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Interestingly, persecutory delusions were not predicted by normative beliefs and
were still only significantly predicted by health concerns as described with Hypothesis 2.
Expansive and primary delusions were both predicted by spirituality, and were not
predicted by any of the eight PCA components similar to Hypothesis 2. This is in line
with the nature of both of these delusional beliefs as they typically involve positive
aspects directed towards special powers or abilities and having a purpose from a power
greater than themselves. It may be possible that in endorsing spirituality, individuals may
inherently possess a belief that they are an important participant in a transcendent
spiritual process, which is reflected with a heightened view of themselves. This may
allow for any grandiose-related beliefs to be more readily acceptable.
Other and simple delusions (i.e., beliefs based on guilt, depersonalization,
hypochondriasis) were positively predicted by spirituality, but negatively predicted by
religiosity. Surprisingly, this may suggest a distinct difference between the nature of
spiritual and religious beliefs amongst college students where those who endorse higher
levels of religiosity do not have many beliefs relating to guilt, sins, and somatic concerns.
One way to view these finding is that those with religious beliefs may be more inclined to
view their experiences (health concerns, stressors) as divine providence, and take comfort
in common religious practices such as confession or repentance. Thus, these cultural
elements might, in some ways, reduce concerns that might underlie certain types of
delusional ideation for some individuals. Conversely, those who do not hold religious
beliefs may view their experiences in a different framework (e.g., internal locus of
control; Rotter, 1966), and as a result may experience greater guilt, depersonalization,
and bodily concern as a way to reduce uncertainty (Martens, 2012) as they may not
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subscribe to the cultural elements described above and may not attribute their experiences
to divine providence.
Delusions relating to thought reading and broadcasting were positively predicted
by spirituality and negatively predicted by the number and satisfaction of friends.
Interestingly, this suggests that those who endorse spiritual beliefs may be more inclined
to endorse that their own thoughts are being shared without their permission to those
around them. These individuals may not be open to social corrective feedback relating to
their thoughts. Alternately, this may suggest that these individuals do not have a trusted
and satisfying group of friends that they feel comfortable in sharing their thoughts with.
Therefore, they may not have the opportunity to receive any social feedback relating to
their thoughts and beliefs. In contrast, those with more friends and satisfaction with these
relationships may be more responsive to social corrective feedback dissuading notions
that their thoughts are being broadcasted without their permission.
Both personal beliefs and civic responsibility did not contribute to the prediction
of delusional ideation. This may be because both of these may be viewed as abstract
concepts for individuals within our sample. Additionally, as previously mentioned
individuals may be still in the process of developing beliefs relating to personal aspects
and civic engagement (Arnett, 1997; Arnett, 2000) whereas religious or spiritual beliefs
may be somewhat more so imparted to them at a younger age. Only three of the eight
PCA components formed significant relationships with the prediction of delusional
ideation for this exploratory research question.
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Overall Impressions of Findings and Larger Implications
The results from this study provided evidence for important processes that might
influence delusional ideation. However, upon reflection, there are still many unanswered
questions that our findings do not fully clarify. For example, we still cannot say why
some people develop delusional beliefs (let alone specific delusional beliefs) while others
do not. One barrier to discovering the idiopathic pathways to delusion development may
involve the statistics we (as a field) employ. While gathering and reporting aggregate and
average data is viewed as key within the research world, understanding the nuances of
symptomology through more qualitative methodology may yield richer information in a
clinical sense, especially with complex symptomology such as delusional beliefs. We did
collect some limited qualitative data when administering the PDI-40 online, but the
systematic examination of this data is outside the timeframe/scope of the current project.
We do have a wealth of quantitative data that, if examined in a non-traditional way, may
be useful in illustrating the variance of beliefs and symptomology across individuals (vs.
averages). For example, when we examined the scores from our symptom and belief
measures in the three highest scoring PDI-40 scorers, we saw wide degree of variability.
These individual differences may have been fundamental in understanding the specific
delusional ideation endorsed. This could highlight the importance of qualitative
methodology in researching beliefs as quantitative results only provide a certain depth of
information and understanding of this highly intricate phenomenon. The importance of
using mixed methods research may assist in providing both the strength of quantitative
research and the nuance and richness of qualitative data that can provide additional
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information regarding concepts of idiopathic factors, multifinality, and equifinality
(Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996).
Additional Clinical Implications
The consideration of the content, function, and meaning of beliefs may help guide
potential interventions. Shaping potentially maladaptive or mildly distorted beliefs before
they become systematized, and subsequently reinforced/maintained, may be key to
successful preventive interventions. By addressing potential underlying aspects such as
the intolerance of uncertainty, and the desire to impose an explanation on uncomfortable
experiences, an individual could be taught how to assess the accuracy and logic of their
own thoughts and beliefs. This might be especially important in those with risk-indicators
or a family history of serious mental health disorders. It is also important to consider the
interaction between delusional ideation, and an individual’s sense of purpose, selfesteem, and positive affect. Without fully understanding this relationship we may be
treating beliefs that act to maintain an individual’s self-view without providing any
potential buffers. This might have unintended negative consequences. For example,
someone with grandiose beliefs about unique abilities or characteristics that they possess
may experience an increase in distress and other factors such as depression if this
grandiose belief was not present due to implications of treatment.
Limitations
There were a number of limitations in the present study. Participants in this study
were a part of a convenience sample, with a majority being male and Caucasian. This
may impact the generalizability of any findings. Additionally, all data collected was
based on self-report provided by participants. The length of the administration of this
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study may have caused some participants to experience fatigue. Similarly, there were a
large number of variables present in this study, which may be related to statistical
artifacts (e.g., multicollinearity; alpha inflation with multiple comparisons). On the other
hand, we recognize that the development of beliefs is extremely nuanced and we may not
have had enough of the “right” measures to adequately capture these processes. Although
a majority of the measures used in this study have reliable psychometric properties, there
were some measures such as the PDI-40 and the CBQ-P in which internal consistency by
Cronbach’s alpha were lower than recommended values. However, the authors of the
PDI-40 have stated that this may not be a strong limitation as it allows for the nuances of
delusional ideation within sub-types to exist. Additionally, we may be assessing points in
a sub-clinical population where beliefs may be developing, but we are unable to develop
exact timelines of this. In regards to the PCA, despite gaining meaningful groupings of
our variables, we may have also lost information regarding the contributions of the
variables that comprised each of the eight resulting components. Finally, due to the
nature of our study variables, elements of social desirability in disclosing information
regarding mental health and other factors may have been present. Despite these
limitations, findings from this study contribute to the current literature.
Future Research
Future research should seek to expand and clarify on the idiosyncratic factors that
may contribute to the formation and maintenance of delusional ideation. Further
understanding of the possible factors that influence this phenomenon may strongly
influence future treatment interactions and interventions. In order for this to occur,
research would need to elaborate on both beneficial and maladaptive associations with
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delusional ideation in order to highlight their multifaceted influence. Future research
should also look to establishing longitudinal studies of delusion formation and
maintenance in a variety of samples such as sub-clinical, clinical high risk, first episode,
and chronic populations. As stated above, mixed methods research of beliefs and
delusional ideation is extremely important to increase our understanding on both
universal and idiopathic factors that may contribute to the formation and maintenance of
delusional beliefs.
Conclusions
The present study provides some further support for the potential idiopathic and
specific pathways by which delusional ideation is formed and maintained. Elements of
cognitive processes, mood, symptomology, social interactions and satisfaction, and at
times certain normative beliefs appeared to be present and predictive of certain types of
delusional ideation. Additionally, potential positive and maladaptive influences of
delusional ideation were also examined and suggested that the content of delusional
beliefs may also be reflective of an individual’s own self view. Delusional ideation may
therefore form in part due to an intolerance of uncertainty, beliefs reflecting one’s selfview, and relationships between concurrent health and social supports in order to provide
a sense of relief from any distress or tension.
Additionally, some of the elements examined, including self-view and social
supports, may also form corrective reality-based feedback that is protective against the
formation of delusional beliefs. Examining sub-clinical symptomology in the pathways to
the formation and maintenance of beliefs, including delusional ideation, may further
assist in providing support for developmental pathways and treatment outcomes for
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individuals with delusional ideation. This study helps to move the field forward in
understanding these pathways and how the formation and maintenance of delusional
ideation and belief systems are highly individualized, intricate, nuanced, and complex.
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